10:00 11.09.2026
Seoul’s Arctic pivot: Why South Korea is turning to the Northern Sea Route
© Russian Arctic and Far East Development
In August 2026, South Korea sent a container ship to Europe via the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for the first time. The routepasses through Russian waters, but with an important caveat: the vessel will transit without calling at Russian ports. Earlier, on the sidelines of the 2026 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, a representative of the Korean Association for Arctic Shipping announced that the transit was being planned.
But why is a Western-oriented country known for its subtropical climate showing an interest in the Russian Arctic, and what goals is it pursuing? Arctic.ru spoke to Yevgeny Kim (Kim Yen-Un), PhD in Philosophy and a leading researcher at the Center for Korean Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of China and Contemporary Asia.
Sanctions barrier vs. economic benefits
The key, though not immediately obvious, reason for this cautious approach is Europe’s sanctions pressure. Seoul is effectively unable to pay for services at Russian ports because of the restrictions imposed against Moscow. According to the expert, this factor is holding back normal cooperation.
“They voluntarily imposed around 1,500 sanctions on us, but they will not be able to cooperate with us normally until they lift them,” Yevgeny Kim notes.
At the same time, the NSR could be hugely important for South Korea. The route from Busan to Rotterdam through the Arctic is 36% shorter than the traditional route through the Suez Canal. This not only reduces shipping costs but also significantly increases the profitability of trade.
“Like normal businesspeople, they are looking for ways to deliver goods more cheaply and quickly. Logistics and supply chains are of exceptional importance to them,” the expert emphasizes.
Geopolitical ambitions or show business?
Beyond economic considerations, Seoul’s decision is also driven by ambition. South Korea is among the world’s 11 largest economies by GDP, and its leadership has consistently sought to strengthen the country’s position beyond the Korean Peninsula. Former President Yoon Suk Yeol set out a course toward global leadership, and his successor, Lee Jae Myung, has continued along the same lines. However, in Yevgeny Kim’s view, this policy involves more publicity than strategy.
“Sometimes it looks more like show business. They don’t care what people say about them, as long as people are talking about them,” the expert quips.
Nevertheless, the Arctic remains a powerful draw, and Seoul is doing everything it can to avoid being left on the sidelines of the Arctic agenda.
In 2013, at the Arctic Council’s ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, South Korea was granted permanent observer status.
Along with South Korea, several other Asian countries received the same status at the time – China, Japan, India and Singapore.
A major stumbling block
In addition to political obstacles, South Korea faces a technological limitation: it lacks experience in building an icebreaker fleet comparable to Russia’s. Although the geographic location of South Korean ports could make the country a natural hub for Asian nations seeking access to the Arctic, the window of opportunity is narrowing.
The history of the Zvezda Shipbuilding Complex in Primorye, at Bolshoy Kamen Bay, which began in 2009, is a case in point.
The project was initially a joint venture, with 80% owned by the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) and 20% by South Korea’s DSME. The Korean company was expected to provide shipbuilding expertise for offshore equipment and large vessels, ranging from tankers to icebreakers. However, DSME withdrew from the joint venture in 2012, and the project was taken over by a Russian consortium of customers. In February 2024, the Zvezda Shipbuilding Complex was sanctioned by the United States for its involvement in building vessels for the Arctic LNG 2 project.
Thus, Seoul missed a strategic opportunity to become part of Arctic shipbuilding. According to Yevgeny Kim, continued compliance with anti-Russia restrictions will only make the situation worse, while competitors are moving forward.
“The longer they continue to comply with sanctions against Russia, the fewer opportunities they will have to secure favorable terms for participating in the development of the transport and logistics potential. The People’s Republic of China is currently very active and is ready to participate in our infrastructure projects,” Yevgeny Kim warns.
It is worth noting that the South Korean government took another step toward implementing its NSR development strategy when it approved a special law in April this year – the Law on the Promotion of the Use of the Northern Sea Route and Development of Related Industries. The law will take effect six months after its enactment, in October.
The legislation defines the NSR and related industries, provides for the development of a national master plan, and calls for the establishment of specialized institutions.
In particular, the Arctic Route Committee has already been established under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Kim Min-seok. Its members include individuals “with extensive professional knowledge or experience in such fields as technology, the economy, society and international cooperation related to the Arctic Sea Route.”
In addition, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries has established a Center for the Promotion of Arctic Route Development.
What options does South Korea have?
According to the analyst, the best – and probably the only realistic – scenario for Seoul at this point is to carve out a niche as a reliable customer within the NSR icebreaker escort schedule.
“Naturally, for the appropriate fee and in compliance with all transportation requirements,” Yevgeny Kim concludes.
